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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

PRIVILEGE OF COUNSEL TO EXPLAIN
TRAVERSER'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY
Wilkerson v. State'

At the trial of traverser-appellant for obstructing justice, the traverser did not take the witness stand. His
counsel in argument made the statement that no presumption of guilt arose from that fact. The trial court sustained
the State's Attorney's objection to that statement and ruled
that traverser's counsel could not in any way comment on
his client's failure to take the witness stand. On appeal,
held: Reversed and new trial awarded. The trial court's
action prevented the traverser's counsel from stating to the
jury the law applicable to the situation, which right is guaranteed by the constitutional provision 2 making the jurors
the judges of the law as well as of the facts in criminal cases.
The statute' making criminal defendants competent witnesses at their own request, but not otherwise, provides that
the failure so to testify shall create no presumption of guilt.
Two questions are presented by the case: First, whether
the specific ruling accords with the trend of authority on
the point in states not allowing jurors to judge of the law;
and, second, whether under the Maryland practice whereby
jurors do judge the law, the ramifications of the privilege
against self-incrimination properly come within the scope
of the juror's functions?
The privilege against self-incrimination exists fairly
generally throughout Anglo-American jurisdictions. It not
only protects a criminal defendant from being forced to take
the witness stand in his own trial but also protects any witness, in any case, from being compelled to answer a question, any relevant answer to which might subject him to
criminal prosecution. Only the former aspect of the privilege is here involved. One aspect of that is the extent to
which either prosecution or defense may comment, adversely or favorably, on the defendant's claim of the privilege. Practically all jurisdictions which have the privilege
forbid the court or prosecution to comment adversely upon
the exercise of the privilege, and many cases (not here collected) have ruled on borderline questions of what amounts
to improper comment. The converse question is: May the
1188 Atl. 813 (Md., 1937).
2 Md. Const., Art. XV, Sec. 5.
0 Md. Code, Art. 85, Sec. 4. Md. Declaration of Rights, Sec. 22, is the
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traverser's counsel attempt to explain, by way of comment,
his client's failure to testify?
While there are many cases on the rule that neither trial
court nor prosecuting attorney may comment adversely on
the defendant's failure to testify, there is an apparent
dearth of rulings whether his counsel may attempt to explain such action away.' The inference from this might be
that other jurisdictions are in line with the Maryland rule
as reflected in the principal case to the effect that traverser 's
counsel does have such a privilege. And yet it might be
argued that the rule is wrong because it is unfair to allow
defendant the privilege of pointing out the favorable aspects of his refusal to testify without allowing the prosecution that of emphasizing the unfavorable ones.' It might be
pointed out that the significance of the statutory rule that
no presumption shall arise from the claim of the privilege
is that the subject of defendant's failure to testify shall be
severely left alone in evidence and argument.
A distinction might be suggested between the traverser's
counsel merely stating the legal rule as to failure to testify
(as he did in the principal case) and his attempt to explain
the failure away on the facts. The latter situation would
hardly arise as there would be little likelihood of evidence
being in the case (other than defendant's own, which is not)
capable of explaining away his failure, and counsel cannot
furnish evidence in argument.
Some jurisdictions (where trial judges must grant
prayers in criminal cases) in effect permit the former type
of comment by requiring the trial judges to instruct (at the
request of the defendant) that no presumption of guilt shall
arise from the claim of the privilege. But this still leaves
unanswered the second question whether defendant's counsel may attempt to explain away the failure to testify, on
the facts of the case. Other jurisdictions forbid adverse
comment but do not require the court to warn the jury
against any unfavorable inference.
An interesting question which could arise in Maryland
and in any other jurisdiction having the privilege is this:
Would it be reversible error for the trial judge or the prose' See Annotation, 84 A. L. R. 784, 794. In Collins v. State, 143 Ark. 604,
221 S. W. 455 (1920), and Meador v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 357,23 S. W. (2nd)
382 (1929), it was indicated that the defendant would not be permitted,
as a matter of right, to comment on his failure to testify, but the cases
went off on the point of the prosecution being permitted to comment adversely after the defendants had first, without objection, explained the
failure to testify.
Consider the Arkansas and Texas cases cited in the preceding footnote.

WILKERSON v. STATE
cutor to remind the jury, against the wishes of the defendant, that the rule was that they should not draw any unfavorable inferences from the latter's failure to testify?' With
proper intonations, such a reminder could well, in fact, put
the defendant in an unfavorable light by reminding the jury
of the fact that defendant had not taken the stand when,
otherwise, they might have minimized its effect.
The ruling in the principal case cannot be taken as a
square decision that the import of the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination is that defendant's counsel
may attempt to explain away his client's failure to testify.
This is because the court chose to put it on the right of
traverser to advance his theory of the law of the case to the
jury, right or wrong, rather than on a square decision that
the privilege against self-incrimination includes the right
to explain away the exercise of it.
While it so happens that the statement made by traverser's counsel in the instant case was a correct statement
of law, practically quoted from the applicable statute, yet the
language of the court's opinion would permit counsel for a
defendant to make a broader statement, not so certain as to
its intrinsic correctness.
The Maryland rule that the jurors shall be the judges of
the law as well as the facts in criminal cases has as one of
its ramifications the proposition that lawyers at the trial
may read law books to the jury and argue questions of law
in their presence. This privilege has been held not to extend
to arguing the constitutionality of the statute proceeded
under," nor to the question of the repeal of the statute, once
that had been settled by ruling on the demurrer,8 nor to
matters of the admissibility of evidence.9 On the other
hand, the local rule does permit counsel to disagree with a
voluntary instruction already given by the trial court, before
the close of the argument."° The rule of the principal case
permitting his counsel to comment on traverser's failure to
testify is another consequence of the local rule permitting
argument on the law to the jury.
Accepting, for the sake of the argument, that it is desirable to permit defense counsel to explain away the traverser's failure to testify, the question arises whether the
court's putting it on the rule that jurors judge the law,
See Annotation, 68 A. L. R. 1108, 1158.
Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236 (1858).
8 Nolan v. State, 157 Md. 332, 146 Atl. 268 (1929).
'Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108 (1881) ; Jules v. State, 85 Md. 305, 313, 36 Atl.
1027 (1897).
10 Vogel v. State 163 Md. 267, 162 Atl. 705 (1932).
o
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rather than on its being a consequence of the privilege
against self-incrimination itself, was desirable.
The usual significance of the rule that the jurors judge
the law is that they interpret the legal rules involved in the
definition of the crime proceeded under and decide their
applicability to the facts of the case. As we have seen, they
are denied the privilege of judging of the constitutionality
or repeal of a statute, or of matters of the admissibility of
evidence. It might be argued that the privilege against
self-incrimination, itself a rule of evidence, is one that does
not concern the jury in its function to determine the "law of
the case", and so that the power of counsel to comment on
client's failure to testify must be found from some other
source than the power of the jurors to judge of the law. It
would have been better to have made a square ruling that
an implication of the privilege against self-incrimination is
that counsel may explain client's availing of the privilege,
rather than to leave it a matter of counsel's right to argue
law to the jury. It would be equally appropriate to say that
defense counsel could argue that the trial judge was in error
in excluding some of his evidence. This just as much involves a presentation of the defendant's view of the law of
the case to the jury, and yet the court has in an earlier case
forbidden that as not being within the scope of the privilege
of arguing the law.
Even if one can accept the unfairness of permitting defendant to argue that no unfavorable inference should be
drawn, while the prosecution is forbidden to argue in favor
of one, yet the case leaves unanswered whether defendant
can go farther and make a factual explanation of his failure
to testify. Then, too, it would have been better to have put
the rule squarely on its being a privilege itself guaranteed
by the constitutional and statutory privilege against selfincrimination, rather than on the dubious point of its being
an incident of arguing the law of the case to the jurors. As
long as the court continues to put it on that point it will be
impossible to get a square ruling as to how far counsel may
go in justifying a client's failure to testify. One might well
say that in the principal case the correct result was reached,
but by a wrong route.

